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In the last twenty years, the United States government has put substantial resources 
behind the fight against .foreign bribery by using the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCP A) to prosecute unilaterally foreign and domestic companies who engage in 
corruption abroad The United States is not entirely alone in this effort, but other countries 
have been far less vigorous in investing resources in investigations and prosecuting cases. 
Because of the unilateral and extraterritorial nature of FCP A prosecutions, these cases 
are sometimes controversial as foreign governments resist American influence in their 
commercial relations. 
In response to this international tension, as well as a desire for a more robust global 
anticorruption regime, commentators have called far a centralized international court to 
address corruption issues. This proposa� however, is legally fraught and highly politically 
infeasible, and, thus, quite unlikely to succeed Nonetheless, the future trajectory of an 
international anti-bribery regime remains an important question, which could have 
significant effects on the future of U.S. extraterritorial enfarcement. 
This Article provides an alternative and far more politically viable outline of the 
likely development of a multilateral approach to anticorruption enfarcement. Drawing on 
the U.S. 's experience in international trade law, where the U.S. was also an early and 
unilateral en.forcer, this Article discusses how a multilateral compromise that increases 
global enfarcement can emerge. In doing so, it seeks to sketch out helpful parallels in 
conceptualizing the history and effect of the two approaches to combatting official and 
unofficial barriers to global markets. Rigorous, and sometimes controversia� U.S. 
enfarcement of international trade law led to an institutional shift in the World Trade 
Organization from unilateral to multilateral enfarcement. This Article contemplates the 
likely trajectory of the FCP A and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention through the 
same lens. It argues that the global anti-bribery regime is poised to fallow a similar but 
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less .formal path as developments in trade law, where continued U.S. FCP A prosecutions 
are likely to be leveraged into a flexible multilateral anti-bribery framework built on 
notions of complementarity. This multilateralframework involves more deference by U.S. 
prosecutors to .foreign prosecutors but also leads to higher levels of global anti-corruption 
enforcement. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, the United States has dramatically positioned its
enforcement resources behind an effort to crack down on bribery of foreign
government officials. Using the tools provided by the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA), the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) made fighting overseas corruption a
major goal of American civil and criminal corporate law. Between 2001 and
2015, the federal prosecutors initiated over 379 FCPA cases.' Enforcement
in 2016 followed this upward trend. The penalties in these cases are
regularly in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars and have gone as high
as the $800 million judgment against the German company Siemens AG.
The American global enforcement of the FCPA has become a major source
of international economic policy as well as an important tool of corporate
law.
The FCPA, together with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development's (OECD) Anti-Bribery Treaty, is now one of the core
legal regimes that govern the global economy. Along with international trade
law, anti-bribery law is quickly becoming the new face of global market
regulation, policing attempts to undermine markets through corrupt
payments. Anti-bribery law complements international trade agreements-
which traditionally have targeted lower official barriers to trade-by providing
a regulatory structure to address illicit barriers to trade. While the rate of new
trade law developments appears to be slowing, innovations in anti-bribery
law are still accelerating as a few critical states adopt and strengthen their
national laws to fight international corruption.
This Article argues that the link between international trade law and
anti-bribery law extends to the evolution of the enforcement of the legal
regimes as well. In both areas, the United States has historically been the
first mover in enforcement, leveraging its market size to demand that other
states follow treaty rules. This enforcement push inevitably results in some
opposition from foreign partners, who resist the U.S.'s influence on foreign
commercial interests. This opposition then results in a compromise
1 STANFORD LAW SCHOOL: FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES CLEARINGHOUSE,
fcpa.stanford.edu (last visited June 1, 2016).
2 By some metrics, four of the top ten all-time largest FCPA sanctions occurred in 2016. See
Richard L. Cassin, Reconsidered Odebrecht andBraskemAre on our FCPA Top Ten List, FCPA BLOG (Dec.
29, 2016), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/201 6/12/29/reconsidered-odebrecht-and-braskem-are-
on-our-fcpa-top-ten-l.html.
3 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines:
Coordinated Enforcement Actions by DOJ, SEC and German Authorities Result in Penalties of $1.6
Billion, (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-
1105.html.
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agreement where the parties agree to greater enforcement globally in
exchange for a lessening of U.S. unilateral enforcement.
This dynamic, which has already resulted in the establishment of the
World Trade Organization's (WTO) lauded dispute settlement system, is
beginning to unfold in the anti-bribery context as well. Some anticorruption
advocates, particularly Judge Mark Wolf, have made highly publicized calls
for the creation of an International Anticorruption Court.4 In contrast to
these commentators, this Article does not expect an international court for
anti-bribery law to emerge. A centralized international anticorruption court
would be legally fraught and completely politically infeasible and, thus, quite
unlikely to be successful. Instead, this Article argues that a less formal
agreement between OECD members to increase enforcement of anti-
corruption laws in return for more U.S. deference in resolving domestic
cases may be on the horizon.
This Article proceeds in three parts: first, it introduces the relationship
between international trade law and anti-bribery law as dual instruments to
regulate global markets. This section also discusses how the American push
for greater enforcement in international trade law led to the creation of the
WTO's dispute settlement system, which raised global enforcement in trade
but required the U.S. to agree to a multilateral dispute settlement system.
Second, the Article discusses the OECD's Anti-Bribery Convention, the
U.S.'s use of its broad extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce foreign anti-
bribery law through the FCPA, and the relative dearth of enforcement by
most, but not all, OECD countries (as documented by the OECD itself).
The Article argues that the U.S. is currently taking as dominant a role in
global anticorruption enforcement as it did in international trade. This
practice is leading to some push back from other OECD members, who
worry about bias against their "home" country companies.
Third, the Article explores different ways that the tensions between U.S.
prosecutors and foreign enforcement agencies may be resolved. Although
some commentators have argued in favor of a highly formal court, the
Article maintains that this is infeasible and possibly counterproductive.
Instead, we contend that, as other states adopt more robust foreign anti-
corruption laws, American authorities will embrace a principle of
complementarity, which offers greater deference to its domestic resolution
4 See Robert Rotberg, It's ime for Canada to back an International Anti-Corruption Court, GLOBE &
MAIL: OPINION (April 25, 2016), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/why-canada-should-
back-an-international-anti-corruption-court/article29725219/; See also Mark L. Wolf, The Case for an
International Anti-Corruption Court, BROOKINGS (July 23, 2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-case-for-an-international-anti-corruption-court/; Mark L.
Wolf, We need an international court to stamp out corruption, WASH. POST: OPINIONS July 22, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mark-l-wolf-we-need-an-international-court-to-stamp-
out-corruption/2014/07/22/al5ecc38-10ff-11e4-9285-
4243a40ddc97_story.html?utm term=.7576fae70adb.
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of corruption cases in return for more robust domestic enforcement
measures. Thus, we expect that there will likely be a less formal institutional
resolution than in international trade law, but one that gives prosecutors
greater flexibility to respond to overseas developments. While there may be
a lesser role for American prosecutors in anti-bribery cases against foreign
corporations, we do not anticipate more lax enforcement. Indeed, a
coordinated multilateral system of more robust national enforcement will
lead to greater global enforcement of anti-corruption law as the
jurisdictional net expands and cross-national enforcement resources
increase. This Article concludes that the most productive way forward (and
what we already see a nascent movement towards) is a decentralized and
coordinated regime, not a centralized court.
II. GOVERNING GLOBAL MARKETS:
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND ANTI-BRIBERY LAW
International trade law and anti-bribery law together form the core legal
principles regulating international commercial transactions.' This section
first discusses how these two legal regimes complement each other to
regulate global markets. The section then discusses how the international
trade regime developed its well-known multilateral enforcement system-the
WTO's dispute settlement system-as a response to an American drive to
increase enforcement unilaterally. This section sets the stage for discussing
the enforcement in anti-bribery law in the third and fourth sections.
A. Dual Market Princtles
International trade law, revolving primarily around the WTO but
increasingly around regional arrangements, lowers the formal barriers to
trade. This body of law generally targets offidalgovernmentpoliies such as tariff
levels, regulatory systems, and intellectual property law.6 The goal is to
increase the flow of goods and services across borders while maintaining
each state's ability to choose its optimal regulatory policy.' While critics of
5 See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Defferent Means, Same End: The Contribution of Trade and Investment Treaties
to Ani-Coraption Polig, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY: CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE? 247 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2013) (discussing how
international trade law and international investment law work towards the same goals of non-
discriminatory market treatment as anti-corruption law). This Article does not discuss international
investment law, as investment does not necessarily involve trade in goods or services.
6 For an excellent overview of major elements of international trade law, see MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 25-50 (2d ed.
1999).
7 See DANIEL W. DREZNER, U.S. TRADE STRATEGY: FREE VERSUS FAIR 57-66 (2006)
(discussing the relationship between WTO rules and domestic regulatory choices).
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trade agreements from the left and the right debate how well the WTO and
other trading blocs achieve this balance, there is little doubt that the trade
agreements have structured international trading relationships and increased
international commerce.'
Foreign anti-bribery law maintains the integrity of markets by
criminalizing transactions that seek to gain an improper business advantage
by making private payments to government officials. Almost every state has
its own domestic law prohibiting corruption, but in many states these laws
are rarely enforced. In 1997, members of the OECD committed to
prosecuting private actors' offers of illicit payments in their business
dealings at home and abroad.9 This explicitly extraterritorial enforcement of
anti-bribery laws in a private actor's foreign business transaction can
compensate for the "host" states' (the foreign state where the business
transaction occurs) weak enforcement of their own anti-bribery rules.'o As
such, foreign anti-bribery laws can provide for a more global and consistent
enforcement system of anti-corruption laws.
Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman highlights that one of the goals of anti-
corruption law is global market efficiency." Corruption distorts markets in
several ways." First, the market for major government projects does not
function efficiently when government officials make procurement decisions
on the basis of bribes. In such "grand corruption" cases, government leaders
often receive hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars in bribes in
exchange for selecting a specific bid." These illicit transactions are harmful
in (at least) three ways: (1) the transactions act as a tax on the state's
population because the cost of the bribe is incorporated into the final price
of the project so that the state's taxpayers end up footing the bill for the
bribery, (2) government officials may have decided to undertake the project
as a means to receive bribes, rather than because the project is in the best
interests of the state,'4 thus crowding out more socially and economically
8 See Judith L. Goldstein, Douglas Rivers, & Michael Tomz, Institutions in International Relations:
Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade, 61 INT'L ORG. 37 (2007).
9 See discussion infra Section II.A.
10 These rules exempt activity consistent with the host jurisdiction's written law. As a result, host
nations are free to devise their own anti-corruption rules and are not bound to foreign conceptions of
corruption. See id.
11 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Introduction: The Role of InternationalActors in Fglhting Conuption, in ANTI-
CORRUPTION POLICY: CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE? 3, 8-9 (Susan
Rose-Ackerman & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2013).
12 For a broader discussion of all of the ways that anti-corruption law can influence markets, see
Phillip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organi-ation: Discerning the Limits of the World Trade
Organiation 'sAuthorit, 28 NYU J INT'L L. & POL. 711 (1995).
13 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Grand" Corrption and the Ethics of Global Business, 26 J. BANK. &
FIN. 1889 (2002).
14 ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, THE GRABBING HAND, GOVERNMENT
PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES (1998).
2018] 227
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
beneficial projects, and (3) the work done on "corrupt" projects is often
shoddily done because the contractors know that they are only accountable
to the political leaders they have paid off." These economic costs do not
include the social costs of corruption to democratic values or government
legitimacy.
Corruption can also distort markets by giving corrupt actors an
improper advantage in private markets. If a business can bribe government
officials to waive regulatory rules (such as making sure buildings are
earthquake-resistant)6 or to avoid taxes, then it may also be able to sell
goods to consumers at a lower price than law-abiding businesses. For
instance, in U.S. v. Kay, the Department of Justice alleged that American
Rice Inc. (ARI) bribed Haitian customs officials to under-report ARI's levels
of imports, which reduced the import tax that ARI owed to the Haitian
government." ARI could then turn this lower tax burden into a business
advantage relative to other private firms by undercutting prices (in addition
to depriving the Haitian government of needed tax revenue).
Together, international trade law and international anti-bribery law
target official and unofficial barriers to international commerce.19 The WTO
Agreements (and regional arrangements) reduce tariff levels and limit
discriminatory regulations that target imports. These rules address overt
government policies and commit states to opening their markets to some
degree. In contrast, international anti-bribery law focuses on illicit
government action. It prohibits attempts to avoid competition (or gain an
improper advantage) by offering corrupt payments to government officials.
In combination, these two legal regimes address both overt and covert
government actions.
Both of these regimes require government resources to enforce their
principles, yet the regimes have chosen very different methods of
enforcement. While both are based on international agreements, the trade
regime has generally chosen to opt for state-to-state enforcement of the
rules, whereas the anti-bribery regime is based on national enforcement of
domestic law. The next sub-section discusses the development of the
international trade regime's dispute settlement system. Part Three turns to
the anti-bribery regime's enforcement system.
15 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 11, at 8-9.
16 See, e.g., Sichuan earthquake killed more than 5 000 pupils, says China, THE GUARDIAN: WORLD
(May 7, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/07/china-quake-pupils-death-toll
(discussing allegation that corruption allowed below grade construction of buildings, which then
collapsed during an earthquake).
17 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
18 Id.
19 See Pauwelyn, supra note 5 at 247-63.
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B. The Development of Trade Law Enforcement
The global trade system primarily revolves around GATT/WTO
treaties.o This system currently includes over 160 countries, including all of
the world's large economies (except for some of the oil-producing states in
the Middle East).2 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
was born as part of the post-WWII system of economic coordination and
re-integration. The pre-war period had seen a dramatic rise in tariff levels
and other trade barriers that sharply decreased the volume of international
trade.2 2 Post-war efforts to revive international trade were originally focused
on the creation of the International Trade Organization (TO), an
international organization that would have been the trade portion of the
Bretton Woods economic institutions.23  The ITO had fully articulated
dispute resolution provisions, but the organization failed to materialize
when the U.S. refused to ratify the agreement.2 4
Instead of attempting to renegotiate the trade organization, states fell
back on the barebones bargaining rules that they had used to negotiate
preliminary tariff reductions.5 These GATT rules26 included some non-
discriminatory principles but did not address dispute resolution for ex post
disagreement concerning implementation.27  As a result, the system
developed an ad hoc procedure of resolving disputes based on consensus.2 8
Recalcitrant defendants could effectively veto the resolution of claims by
refusing to agree to the formation of dispute resolution panels or rejecting
20 Even regional agreements must comply with WTO rules on preferential trade arrangements.
See Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Ovendew, in NEW DIMENSIONS OF REGIONAL
INTEGRATION Gaime de Melo & Arvind Panagariya, eds., 1993).
21 For a full list of WTO members, see
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tife/org6_e.htm.
22 See Douglas Irwin, The GATTin Historical Perpective, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 323, 323-25 (1995).
23 John H. Jackson, Fragmentation or Unfication Among International Institutions: the World Trade
Organiation, 31 NYUJ INT'L L & POL. 823, 826-27 (1998).
24 Id The ITO failed when the Truman Administration refused to submit the treaty to the
Senate for advice and consent. The administration believed that the treaty lacked political support
from free-trade groups and faced significant protectionist resistance in the Senate. With the
beginnings of the Cold War on the foreign policy horizon, President Truman did not want to spend
the political capital necessary to secure passage of the ITO. See William Diebold, Reflections on the
International Trade OrganiZation, 14 N. ILL. UL REV. 335 (1993).
25 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAWAND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 35-43 (2d. ed. 1999).
26 The bargaining rules were themselves called the "GATT," the general agreement on tariffs
and trade. Given that a more formal organization for trade issues did not exist, the trade regime took
on the name GATT to reflect its reliance on these framework rules. Id
27 Robert E. Hudec, The Role of the GATT Secretanat in the Evolution of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Procedure, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND 101, 102-03 Jagdish Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch
eds., 1998).
28 Id
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the panel's reports.2 9 Over the history of the GATT regime, from 1947 to
1995, the system evolved to include some more formal procedures, but it
remained slow and subject to abuse.30
While the GATT system was the only internationally endorsed
mechanism for resolving trade disputes, several states grew frustrated with
these legal processes and began to use their own unilateral procedures to
determine whether trading partners were breaching trade rules. In particular,
the U.S. adopted a domestic law (Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act) that
required national regulators to consider private claims concerning whether
GATT members were breaching trade law or otherwise adopting "unfair
trade" practices.' If the regulator determined that the partner state was
breaching trade rules, then the statute enabled the U.S. president to impose
trade sanctions on the offending state unilaterally.32 Thus, the U.S. acted as
a shadow trade enforcer, imposing trade sanctions on states breaching
GATT agreements.
The U.S. practice of unilaterally determining whether a foreign state had
breached trade rules and, if so, what the proper remedy to such a breach
would be was controversial.4 GATT members unsurprisingly disagreed
about the application of trade rules and protested American determinations
that they were in breach of trade agreements. In addition, many states did
not appreciate the U.S. using its greater economic power to work outside of
the GATT procedures to enforce trade rules. Finally, many states argued
that the U.S.'s Section 301 system was one-sided. They argued that the U.S.
also breached trade rules, but, because unilateral sanctions relied on
American economic power (specifically, the threat of exclusion from the
large American market), the U.S. was effectively immune from enforcement.
No other state had the economic size to threaten the U.S. when it was
29 William J. Davey, THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 8 (III. Pub. L. Res. Paper
No. 03-08, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=41 9943.
30 See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE
DIPLOMACY (2d ed. 1990) (analyzing the development of GATT legal procedure and finding that it
became more formal and effective over time); see also Rachel Brewster, Rule-Based Dispute Resolution in
International Trade, 92 VA. L. REV. 251, 253-55 (2006) (summarizing the GATT dispute resolution
process).
31 See JACKSON, supra note 25, at 127-32. The European Community also adopted a similar rule
in the 1990s. Id
32 Id
33 Id See also TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 6, at 8 (discussing how the US used the 1988
"Super 301" as a means of enforcing trade rules).
34 Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Ovendew, in AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM:
AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 1 Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T.
Patrick eds., 1990) (arguing that U.S. policy is overly aggressive).
35 TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 6, at 8-9.
36JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND 149 (1995); Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional Desi gn, Retaliation, and Trade Law
Enforcemen, 80 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 102, 108 (2011).
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alleged to have breached trade rules. In the late 1980s, the pace of U.S.
unilateral sanctioning increased. Congress passed amendments to Section
301 through the 1988 Trade and Competitiveness Act that further increased
the conditions under which sanctions could be applied.37 All of this set the
stage for a change in the process of trade law enforcement in the GATT's
Uruguay Round of negotiations.
During this period, the U.S. consistently argued that it wanted a more
robust enforcement mechanism at the international level. The executive
branch argued for a more formal rule-based process for years (and over
several administrations), and Congress included demands for strong
international enforcement of trade rules in statutes.38  European
governments and the Japanese government were less enthusiastic about
adopting a more rule-oriented dispute resolution system, preferring
diplomatic approaches to managing trade disagreements.39 However, the
increased American use of unilateral sanctioning convinced these
governments that, on net, a more judicial system would be beneficial if it
required the U.S. to gain multilateral approval before adopting any
sanctions.40 The subsequent WTO "court" was the compromise. Though
not a formal court, the WTO adjudicates disputes between its members. The
WTO panel or, if appealed, the Appellate Body, must find that a member
has breached trade law before another member is permitted to impose trade
sanctions.4 ' The level of sanctions is also subject to WTO arbitration.
In effect, the U.S. government was able to leverage its practice of
unilaterally enforcing trade law against other states into a strong multilateral
enforcement of international trade law. The quid pro quo was the U.S.
agreement o be bound by the WTO dispute resolution system. The U.S.
would not apply sanctions against other countries until it received approval
from the WTO system. In return, other WTO member states agreed to
move away from the more diplomatic consensus-approach of the GATT
regime and consent to litigate all trade disputes. The result was a greater role
for law in the international trade regime.43
37 JACKSON, supra note 25, at 130-32; Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Heart of the
1988 Trade Act A Legislative Histor of the Amendments to Section 301, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1988).
38 See Brewster, szpra note 30, at 278-79.
39 See Rachel Brewster & Andrew Chilton, Supplying Compliance: Wh and When the United States
Complies nith WTO Rulings, 39 YALE J. INT'L L. 201, 205-06 (2014).
40 Id.; see also Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Over- view of the First
Three Years, 8 MINN.J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 13-14 (1999) (discussing how European powers viewed the
new WTO system as a means to constrain Congress).
41 Brewster, s/pra note 36, at 112-16.
42 Id.
43 Under this dispute resolution system, the U.S. has been both a winning and losing litigant
before the WTO. When the U.S. wins as a plaintiff, the system provides the U.S. sanctions (or threat
of sanctions) with greater legitimacy because the authorization for sanctions comes from a multilateral
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More broadly, and relevant to anti-bribery law, the American interest in
aggressive enforcement of international trade law created global tensions. In
the absence of a robust international institution to enforce trade rules, the
U.S. reverted to unilateral enforcement. The U.S. generally understood its
actions as fair, but other governments saw bias because the U.S. was single-
handedly determining whether a breach occurred and what the appropriate
remedy was. As U.S. enforcement increased, other governments became
more willing to accept a strong multilateral commitment to enforcement as
a means of constraining American enforcement.44 Although the context is
somewhat different, and the institutional solution will almost certainly be
different, we see a similar pattern of events taking place in the anti-bribery
regime. It is to that area that we now turn.
III. THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL ANTI-BRIBERY
ENFORCEMENT: THE FCPA AND THE OECD TREATY
This section begins by examining the history and the current application
of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPA was passed
in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal in the 1970s but was not seriously
enforced until the late 1990s. As the second part of this section describes,
the uptick in U.S. enforcement occurred as it worked with other major
exporting countries to negotiate and ratify the OECD's Anti-Bribery
Convention.4 ' The OECD treaty obligated all member states to adopt
legislation similar to the FCPA. The third part of this section discusses how,
while almost all states have ratified the treaty, there remains a dearth of
enforcement of these rules by some national authorities. The result is that
the U.S. is the overwhelming enforcer of anti-bribery law, although
Germany, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and Switzerland are also active
enforcers. As Section IV of this Article discusses, this has led to some
tension between the U.S. and other OECD countries, which view the U.S.
as aggressive in its application of the FCPA.
A. The Histoy ofthe FCPA
adjudication process. However, the U.S. has not won all of its cases as a plaintiff and has had to accept
foreign government policies as legal. As a defendant, the U.S. has also faced the threat of sanctions
from other states when it breached trade rules.
44 See Brewster, supra note 30; See also Hudec, supra note 40, at 13-14 (analyzing European states
willingness to engage in dispute resolution discussions as a means of constraining American economic
sanctions).
45 See Rachel Brewster, Enforcing the FCPA: International Resonance and Domestic Strateg, 103 V. L.
Rev. 1611 (2017); Rachel Brewster & Sam Buell, The Market for GlobaAndcorruption Enforcement, 80 L.
& CONT. PROB. 101 (2017).
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Although it is now widely perceived as economically inefficient and bad
for development,4 6 corruption was once perceived as helpful and efficient47
Samuel Huntington once asserted that 'the only thing worse than a society
with a rigid, over-centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-
centralized, honest bureaucracy."'48 But that view has changed dramatically.
The World Bank's change in position exemplifies the broader change in
the view of corruption.49 The World Bank once labeled corruption a
"political" issue, that is, an issue out of its purview.o In doing so, it was
accepting the Samuel Huntington view that bribes could be a "valuable
way to cut through bureaucratic red tape."" As information on the negative
effects of corruption came to light, and pressure to act against corruption
increased, one of the World Bank's regional directors left in 1993 to found
Transparency International, an anti-corruption non-governmental
organization (NGO)." By 1996, the World Bank had revised its
classification of corruption, labeling it an economic issue, and it had changed
53
its position to a firmly anti-corruption one.
One innovation that spurred this change in views of corruption is the
FCPA. 4 During the investigation that followed Watergate, the SEC
discovered that many U.S. corporations had been using unreported slush
funds to make "questionable or illegal foreign payments."" Upon realizing
that the questionable-foreign-payments problem was likely widespread, the
SEC instituted a Voluntary Disclosure Program.6 This program asked
companies to investigate and disclose questionable or illegal payments they
had made; in exchange, the likelihood that the SEC would bring any
enforcement action against these companies would be "diminished."
Companies did disclose these payments, and, as it turned out, they had made
substantial questionable payments, including payments to government
46 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International Legalication in the F ght
against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 159-160 (2002).
47 Id at 158.
48 SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968) (quoted in
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 46, at 158).
49 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 46, at 158-159.
50 Id at 159.
51 Id at 158.
52 Id at 159.
53 Id
54 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 et seq.
55 SEC, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES
3 (1976) [hereinafter SEC REPORT]; see also Mike Koehler, The Stor of the Foreign Corwpt Practices Act,
73 OHIO ST. L. J. 929, 932 (2012).
56 SEC REPORT, supra note 55, at 6-7.
57 Id at 8-13.
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officials while conducting business abroad." In all, over 400 corporations
had "reported paying out well in excess of $300 million. . . to foreign
government officials, politicians, and political parties."5 9 For example, it was
discovered that Lockheed had paid off Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan,
Prince Bernhardt of the Netherlands, and Italian government officials, all to
win contracts.6 0 The aftermath of this revelation had negative implications
for U.S. foreign policy - "[floreign governments friendly to the United
States in Japan, Italy, and the Netherlands ha[d] come under intense pressure
from their own people."6 '
Congress had several reasons for deciding to enact the anti-corruption
legislation that would become the FCPA. First, as illustrated by the
aftermath of the Lockheed scandal, these recently uncovered corruption
scandals were bad foreign policy in the Cold War era.2 Corruption was
harming the American reputation, and, as a result, "[t]he image of American
democracy abroad ha[d] been tarnished."6 3 Corrupt American companies
served only to fulfill the Soviet Union's and others' negative perceptions of
the American system.4 Not every American corporation was bribing
abroad, but those that were bribing abroad were giving all American
corporations a bad name.5 Second, corruption was undermining market
economics, because business was not won or lost based on price and quality
but on the size of the bribe. Thus, corruption was undermining the
"promot[ion of] democratically accountable governments . . . in developing
countries."6  Third, Congress was convinced that foreign anti-bribery
legislation would not reduce business abroad. Congress was presented with
evidence that non-bribing American companies were achieving success
abroad.69 Furthermore, Congress was under the impression that American
corporations that lost business because they did not bribe were often losing,
not to foreign corporations, but to other American corporations that did
58 See id at Appendix A (listing disclosing corporations and the type and amount of payments
made).
59 REP. STAGGERS, UNLAWFUL CORPORATE PAYMENTS ACT OF 1977, H.R. Doc. No. 95-640,
at 4 (1977) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT 95-640].
60 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 46, at S161; HOUSE REPORT 95-640, at 5.
61 COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES AND DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IMPROVED DISCLOSURE ACTS OF 1977, S.
Doc. No. 95-114, at 3 (1977) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT 95-114].
62 Koehler, supra note 55, at 938-43.
63 SENATE REPORT 95-114, supra note 61, at 3.
64 HOUSE REPORT 95-640, supra note 59, at 5.
65 SENATE REPORT 95-114, supra note 61, at 4.
66 Id at 3-4.
67 SEN. PROXMIRE, CORRUPT OVERSEAS PAYMENTS BY U.S. BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, S. Doc.
No. 94-1031, at 4 (1976) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT 94-1031].
68 Id
69 Id
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bribe.o Combined, this information led to the conclusion that the FCPA
would not be damaging to U.S. business interests abroad. Finally, Congress
concluded that foreign anti-bribery legislation was needed because bribery
was "morally repugnant."n7
The FCPA has two main components. First, it requires companies to
keep accurate books and records and to institute adequate internal controls
to prevent bribery.72 These provisions are meant to prevent the use of slush
funds and the falsification of books and records to disguise bribes.7 3
Second, it prohibits covered actors from bribing or offering a bribe to a
foreign official to "obtain or retain business,"74 or for a "business
purpose."75 The leading FCPA case, United States v. Kay,76 interprets the
business purpose test. Business purpose, or that which is meant to obtain
or retain business, is interpreted broadly to include anything that "secure[s]
an improper advantage."n Kay decided to interpret the term broadly because
Congress had amended the FCPA to bring it into compliance with the
OECD Convention.78 However, the statute and the treaty defined "business
purpose" differently. The OECD Convention language included as a
"business purpose" not only obtaining and retaining business, but also
securing an improper advantage.79 On the other hand, the FCPA, as
amended, listed securing an improper advantage among the acts that
constitute bribery, while "business purpose" was still described only as
obtaining or retaining business.o Kay concluded that the term should not be
read narrowly as prohibiting only the initial gaining of government contracts
and their subsequent renewal." As applied in the case, the FCPA could,
under certain circumstances, prohibit paying a foreign official to gain a tax
advantage."
70 Id
71 SENATE REPORT 95-114, supra note 61 at 4.
72 15 U.S.C. 78m(b).
73 U.S. DEP'T OFJUST., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICEs ACT
38-41 (2016) [hereinafter DOJ GUIDE].
74 15 USCS 78dd-1-3.
75 DOJ GUIDE, supra note 73, at 12-14.
76 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004).
77 Id at 754 (quoting the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention).
78 Id at 753-55.
79 Id at 754.
80 Id at 754.
81 Id at 755-56.
82 Id at 761.
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Like "business purpose," what constitutes a bribe is interpreted broadly.
A bribe can be "anything of value," 3 which can include cash payments,
charitable contributions, and travel and entertainment expenses.8 4
"Foreign officials" include government officers and employees,
candidates for office, and officers and employees of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), if those SOEs are operating as "government instrumentalities."5
"Government instrumentality" is defined in another important FCPA case,
United States v. Esquena.f8 6 Esquena i defined a government instrumentality
as "an entity controlled by the government of a foreign country that
performs a function the controlling government treats as its own." 7
Whether the government controlled the entity, and whether the entity
performed a function the government treated as its own could be
determined by looking at several factors. Factors for assessing whether the
government controls an entity include:
"the foreign government's formal designation of that entity;
whether the government has a majority interest in the entity; the
government's ability to hire and fire the entity's principals; the
extent to which the entity's profits, if any, go directly into the
governmental fisc, and . . . the extent to which the government
funds the entity if it fails to break even; and the length of time these
indicia have existed."88
Factors for determining whether the entity performs a function the
government treats as its own include:
"whether the entity has a monopoly over the function it exists to
carry out; whether the government subsidizes the costs associated
with the entity providing services; whether the entity provides
services to the public at large in the foreign country; and whether
the public and the government of that foreign country generally
perceive the entity to be performing a governmental function."89
Actors covered by the FCPA include U.S. citizens, nationals, and
residents; business entities organized under U.S. law or having their principal
place of business in the United States; and issuers that list their shares on a
U.S. exchange.90 Actors not otherwise covered by the FCPA are nonetheless
83 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1.
84 DOJ GUIDE, supra note 73, at 14-19.
85 Id at 19-21.
86 United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2014).
87 Id at 925.
88 Id
89 Id at 926.
90 15 USCS 78dd-1-2.
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subject to its prohibitions if any part of their bribing activity occurs within
the United States.91
B. The OECD Anti-Bibey Convention
The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention or OECD Convention) is substantially similar to the FCPA.92
Indeed, the FCPA as amended in 1998 was meant to implement the OECD
Convention in the United States.93 The OECD Convention requires states
parties to criminalize the act of bribing a "foreign public official" to "obtain
or retain business" or to gain any "improper advantage in the conduct of
international business."94 It also requires states parties to enact accounting
provisions requiring the keeping of accurate books and records.95 The
OECD Convention and the FCPA target only supply-side bribery. That is,
both texts criminalize the paying of the bribe by a multinational corporation,
not the receiving of the bribe by a foreign government official (the demand
side).96 The OECD Convention was opened for signature in 1997, and
entered into force in 1999. Forty-one states have joined the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, including seven states that are not members of the
OECD.97
After the U.S. passed the FCPA, it became apparent that, despite
previous assurances otherwise,9 8 the statute was costing the U.S. business
abroad.9 9 Before the passage of the FCPA, foreign bribery functioned like a
Prisoner's Dilemma.100 All would be better off if no one paid bribes, but the
incentive was to pay the bribe anyway, lest your competitor beat you to it.101
By passing the FCPA, the United States had committed its multinationals to
91 15 USCS 78dd-3.
92 Rachel Brewster, The Domestic and International Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
15 CHI.J. INT'L L. 84, 100 (2014).
93 SEN. HELMS, CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, S. Doc. No. 105-19 (1998) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT
105-19].
94 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 1(1), Dec. 17, 1997, 37
I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
95 OECD Convention, supra note 94, art. 8(1)
96 Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits ofInstitutionalDesgn: Implementing the OECD Anti-Briber Convention,
44 VA.J. INT'L L. 665, 681-82 (2004).
97 OECD Convention, supra note 94.
98 SENATE REPORT 94-1031, supra note 67, at 4.
99 William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition
Act of 1998, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 34, Number 46 (1998).
100 Tarullo, supra note 96, at 669-71.
101 Id.
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not bribing.102 This arguably provided other states with a competitive
advantage and made other states averse to passing their own anti-bribery
legislation.103 Accordingly, the United States pushed for a treaty to "level the
playing field."10 4 The OECD membership was understandably reluctant to
form a treaty.
In addition to economic incentives not to enter into an anti-bribery
treaty, there was a perception among European governments that the FCPA
was "moralistic legislation that was naive regarding how business operated
in developing countries."1 05 Similarly, many of these governments thought
that prohibiting foreign bribery would be an imperialistic interference with
the way business was conducted in developing countries.1 06
After several years of minimal progress at the OECD, three main factors
turned previous reluctance into willingness to agree to a treaty, and the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was formed. First, several European
countries had their own corruption scandals that turned public opinion
against foreign bribery.1 0 7 Second, the U.S. made anti-corruption a much
higher priority and implied that it might sanction countries that were
permissive on foreign corruption.1 08 Third, developing countries began
prioritizing the issue of anti-corruption and suggested that "governments of
developed countries had, by failing to act against foreign bribery by their
own multinationals, become complicit in that bribery."109 Together, these
factors motivated the OECD to adopt an anti-bribery treaty.
C. OECD Convention Enrcement
1. Under-Enforcement of the OECD Anti-BribeU Convention
The Prisoner's Dilemma problem did not end when the OECD
Convention entered into force; it simply shifted to the enforcement phase."0
Putting the requisite legislation on the books while not enforcing that
legislation might be a strategic policy choice."' Indeed, several countries
might have viewed the OECD Convention as a way to nominally go along
with the anti-corruption regime while in practice continuing to allow their
102 Id at 671-73.
103 Id at 674.
104 SEN. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL ANTI-BRIBERY ACT OF 1998, S. Doc. No. 105-277, at 2
(1998).
105 Brewster, mpra note 92, at 99.
106 Tarullo, supra note 96, at 674.
107 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 46, at 159, 164; Tarullo, supra note 96, at 678-79.
108 Tarullo, supra note 96, at 677-78.
109 Id at 679.
110 Brewster, mpra note 92, at 100-01.
111 Id at 101.
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multinationals to use bribery to win business abroad." Regardless of
whether this was the intent of some of the states when they agreed to the
OECD Convention, under-enforcement has become the state of affairs.
Although states have successfully implemented more or less the correct
legislation as required by the treaty,"3 most states have not taken the next
step of meaningfully enforcing that legislation. The OECD Convention
requires legislation but does not explicitly require enforcement."4 Nor does
it indicate what level of enforcement is appropriate."' This creates the
possibility that a country could nominally comply with all treaty
requirements-implementing the correct legislation criminalizing foreign
bribery and requiring accurate books and records to be kept-while actually
continuing the practice of allowing bribery just as before.
Since the OECD Convention entered into force in 1999, almost half of
the states have never prosecuted a foreign bribery case."6 Table One groups
OECD Convention signatories by the number of enforcement actions each
state has prosecuted. Transparency International (TI) also categorizes states
parties to the OECD Convention as active enforcers, moderate enforcers,
limited enforcers, or little-to-no enforcers."' According to TI's most recent
report on the state of the OECD Convention's enforcement, only four
states qualify as active enforcers: the U.S., Germany, the U.K., and
Switzerland."' These active enforcers account for 22.8% of world exports.
Meanwhile, almost half of the states-twenty states total-have little to no
enforcement."9 These no-enforcement countries account for 20.5% of
world exports.20 In the middle, six countries with 8.9% of world exports
qualified as moderate enforcers, and nine countries with 12.6% of world
exports qualified as limited enforcers."' By logical extension, countries that
do not belong to the OECD Convention, and which therefore have zero
obligations to enforce it, account for 35.2% of world exports.22
112 Tarullo, supra note 96, at 680.
113 OECD, MINISTERIAL DECLARATION: THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION AND ITS
ROLE IN THE GLOBAL FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION: TOWARDS A NEW ERA OF ENFORCEMENT 2
(2016), https://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/OECD-Anti-Bribery-Ministerial-
Declaration-2016.pdf.
114 Brewster, spra note 92, at 100.
115 Id
116 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (TI), EXPORTING CORRUPTION, PROGRESS REPORT
2015: ASSESSING ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATTING FOREIGN
BRIBERY (2015) [hereinafter EXPORTING CORRUPTION].
117 Id
118 Id
119 Id
120 Id
121 Id
122 Id
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Table One: Number of Successful Prosecutions (1999-2014)123
Number of OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Signatories
Actions (includes countries that are not in the OECD but
have joined the treaty)
Zero Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Latvia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, Russia, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Turkey
1-9 Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Sweden, Switzerland
10-49 Hungary, Italy, Korea, United Kingdom
50 or More United States, Germany
The OECD enforces Convention obligations through peer-review
reports. These reports include detailed information in targeted "phases"
laying out a country's compliance with the various treaty requirements.2 4
Among these reports are "Phase 3 Reports," which report on the state's
enforcement of the OECD Convention.'5 Thus, despite ambiguous
enforcement requirements in the treaty itself, the OECD expects countries
not only to put anti-bribery laws on the books but also to enforce those
laws.
The reports highlight political barriers to enforcement.2 6 For instance,
the Phase 3 Report for Greece highlighted the lack of priority government
officials gave to investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery.' The lack of
priority (including low levels of financial resources in this area) resulted in
minimal efforts to seek out or report allegations of bribery. Similarly, the
OECD Working Group that conducted Belgium's Phase 3 evaluation noted
that Belgium's enforcement of its anti-bribery laws suffers from a "flagrant
123 "Successful prosecutions" means prosecutions resulting in sanctions. See OECD Anti-
Bribery Working Group Data, availableathttp://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Working-Group-on-
Bribery-Enforcement-Data-2014.pdf.
124 COUNTRY MONITORING OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countrymonitoringoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm.
125 Id.
126 See, e.g, OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN HUNGARY 22 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/Hungaryphase3reportEN.pdf [hereinafter HUNGARY PHASE 3].
127 See, e.g, OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN GREECE 53 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ Greecephase3reportEN.pdf.
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lack of resources."" Denmark's Phase 3 Report raised concerns that
Denmark was closing cases without thoroughly investigating them.2 9
Furthermore, the Working Group conducting Hungary's Phase 3 evaluation
concluded that Hungary needed to become more proactive in its
130information-gathering efforts.
Another significant barrier to enforcement was improper political
influence of police, prosecutors, and judges, or improper consideration by
police, prosecutors, and judges of the "national economic interest.",3
Consideration of the "national economic interest" is expressly prohibited by
the OECD Convention. 13 These political and economic pressures seemed
to come in two varieties. First, judges and prosecutors were not independent
and were subject to political control. 33 An example of this is the Czech
Republic, where the prosecutor's office is subject to political oversight.34
Second, authorities weighed economic and political factors in deciding how
to proceed with foreign bribery cases. 1' For example, South Africa used to
require prosecutors to consider economic impact, though its laws have since
been amended.'36 But weighing the national economic interest is not always
so obvious. Because consideration of the national economic interest is
expressly prohibited, and because consideration of such factors can be
difficult to detect when prosecutors have discretion, the weighing of these
factors can sometimes be subtle. Sweden's Phase 3 Report, for instance,
discussed the implications of a consideration of Swedish prosecutors-
whether prosecution was in the "public interest, which had not been
explicitly stated not to include the national economic interest.37
But those are merely some of the many reasons why anti-bribery laws
are under-enforced. New Zealand believes that its multinational
128 OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
IN BELGIUM 32. (2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/BelgiumPhase3ReportEN.pdf.
129 OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
IN DENMARK 27-28 (2013), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Denmarkphase3reportEN.pdf.
130 HUNGARY PHASE 3, supra note 126, at 22.
131 OECD Convention art. 5 (prohibiting the consideration of the "national economic interest"
in investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery cases).
132 Id.
133 See, e.g, OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 30 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ CzechRepublicphase3reportEN.pdf.
134 Id.
135 See, e.g, OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN SWEDEN 29 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/Swedenphase3reportEN.pdf [hereinafter SWEDEN PHASE 3]; OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 34-35 (2014),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/SouthAfricaPhase3ReportEN.pdf [hereinafter SOUTH
AFRICA PHASE 3].
136 SOUTH AFRICA PHASE 3, supra note 135, at 34-35.
137 SWEDEN PHASE 3, supra note 135, at 29.
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corporations simply do not commit bribery abroad."' Argentina, among
other countries, does not have laws in place to adequately protect
whistleblowers.3 9 Several states have insufficient penalties for the offense
of foreign bribery. For example, Argentina's foreign anti-bribery legislation
does not provide for corporate liability,'40 and the maximum fine for an
individual who bribes abroad is a mere $10,000.141 Some states, like Italy,
have unique defenses to the offense of foreign bribery. In Italy, there is a
defense called "concussione."'42 If a public official abuses power to induce
a bribe, then the official is guilty of concussione, and the briber is considered
the victim.'43 Portugal, like some other states, does not make effective use
of mutual legal assistance, often not seeking it, even when it would be
appropriate to do so.'44 States like Bulgaria might not have sufficient
capacity to enforce foreign bribery and related offenses; Bulgaria's Phase 3
Report raised concerns that it lacks the capacity to conduct complex
financial investigations.' Other states, like Mexico, do not have sufficient
legislation for related offenses, such as money laundering; Mexico's anti-
money laundering laws do not address money laundering specific to foreign
bribery.'46 In short, states under-enforce anti-bribery laws in a variety of
ways and for a variety of reasons.
2. Enforcement of the OECD Convention by Active Enforcers
The U.S. is currently an active enforcer of the OECD Convention, but
it was not always an active enforcer of its anti-bribery laws. Although the
FCPA had been on the books since 1977, it was not seriously enforced until
138 OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
IN NEW ZEALAND 8 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/NewZealandPhase3ReportEN.pdf.
139 See, e.g, OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN ARGENTINA 60 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Argentina-Phase-3-
Report-ENG.pdf.
140 Id. at 17-19.
141 Id. at 19.
142 See, e.g, OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN ITALY 11-13 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/Italyphase3reportEN.pdf.
143 Id.
144 See, e.g, OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL 24-25 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ Portugalphase3reportEN.pdf.
145 See, e.g, OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN BULGARIA 23 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/Bulgariaphase3reportEN.pdf.
146 See, e.g, OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN MEXICO 23-24 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/Mexicophase3reportEN.pdf.
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1998, around the same time the OECD Convention entered into force.'47
Currently, the U.S. actively enforces anti-bribery laws primarily against its
own multinationals.48 To enforce anti-bribery laws against other countries'
multinationals, it also uses a "very broad jurisdiction approach" that was
facilitated by the implementation of the OECD Convention.'49
The OECD Convention has allowed the United States to expand its
jurisdiction over a wide range of actors. In ratifying the treaty, Congress
amended the FCPA to apply to any person or entity that engages in bribery
(or engages in some action that is part of scheme to bribe) within U.S.
territory.5 0 It also amended the FCPA to apply to U.S. nationals conducting
business abroad, irrespective of whether the business has a territorial link to
the U.S."'
Current U.S. practice is to resolve most FCPA cases not by going to trial
but by using various types of settlement agreements. "The DOJ resolves
most FCPA matters through plea agreements . . ., deferred prosecution
agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs).""' Plea
agreements are used primarily with individual, not corporate, defendants.5
They require the defendant to admit to particular facts and plead guilty to
the offense, and they recommend a sentence or a fine that was agreed upon
by the DOJ and the defendant."4 DPAs and NPAs are often used for
corporate defendants. They require the defendant company to pay a fine
and to "enter into certain compliance and remediation commitments.""' If
the company has fulfilled its commitments, the DOJ will drop the charges
(or, in the case of NPAs, the DOJ will never formally file charges).'
6
As an example of the frequent use of these agreements, in 2015, both
corporate defendants charged that year had their FCPA cases resolved by a
DPA or an NPA.' 7 Seven of the twelve individuals against whom the DOJ
147 Brewster, spra note 92, at 98.
148 Id at 107.
149 Id
150 SENATE REPORT 105-19, supra note 93.
151 Id
152 OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (2010), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/UnitedStatesphase3reportEN.pdf.
153 DOJ GUIDE, supra note 73, at 74.
154 Id at 74.
155 Id at 74.
156 Id at 74-75.
157 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: RELATED ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS: 2015, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/related-enforcement-actions/2015
(providing the corporate defendants-Louis Berger International Inc. and IAP Worldwide Services,
Inc.).
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brought charges had their cases resolved with a plea agreement.' The
remaining five individuals also seemingly entered into plea agreements, but
as of the date of writing have yet to be sentenced.5 9
Another important aspect of present-day FCPA practice is self-
reporting. The DOJ and the SEC have incentivized self-reporting FCPA
violations; they "place a high premium on self-reporting, along with
cooperation and remedial efforts, in determining the appropriate resolution
of FCPA matters."o6 0 From the defendant's perspective, self-reporting can
be an excellent option because companies that report may reduce their
fines, '6 and may increase the likelihood that the DOJ offers an NPA instead
of a DPA. 6  Companies seem to be responding to these incentives. For
instance, from 2011 to 2016, the majority of companies against which the
DOJ brought an FCPA case had voluntarily reported FCPA violations. 6 In
fact, ten of the thirteen companies whose cases were resolved with NPAs
had self-reported their violations.
The U.S. is not the only active enforcer, although it remains the most
vigilant. Germany, like the U.K. and Switzerland, is an active enforcer of the
OECD Convention. In contrast to many states that do not enforce the
OECD Convention actively, Germany has undertaken efforts to raise
awareness of the crime of foreign bribery. 6 In addition, Germany provides
sufficient resources for the investigation and prosecution of such crimes, '6 6
and has specialized police and prosecutors' offices for economic crimes.
Perhaps most significantly, Germany has demonstrated excellent
158 See id (listing the individual defendants as Harder, Rubizhevsky, Rama, Condrey, Hirsch,
McClung, and Mikerin)
159 Seeid (listing the individual defendants as Castillo, Barillas, Munoz, Bastidas, and Fernandez).
For an indication that Fernandez has entered into a plea agreement, see Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Just., Businessman Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Tax Charges in Connection with Venezuela
Bribery Scheme June 16, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/businessman-pleads-guilty-foreign-
bribery-and-tax-charges-connection-venezuela-bribery-scheme. For an indication that Castillo, Barillas,
Munoz, and Bastidas have entered into plea agreements, see Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJust., Miami
Businessman Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Fraud Charges in Connection with Venezuela
Bribery Scheme (March 23, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/miami-businessman-pleads-
guilty-foreign-bribery-and-fraud-charges-connection-venezuela.
160 DOJ GUIDE, supra note 73, at 54.
161 Id at 54.
162 See id at 78 (offering some examples of considerations that went into decisions to decline to
prosecute FCPA violations).
163 See id
164 For FCPA cases and relevant information, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT: RELATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-
fraud/ related-enforcement-actions (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
165 OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
IN GERMANY 62 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/germany-oecdanti-
briberyconvention.htm [hereinafter GERMANY PHASE 3].
166 Id at 41.
167 Id at 40-41.
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coordination with other countries in investigating and prosecuting foreign
bribery, as demonstrated by the Siemens case. 1 Correspondingly, Germany
has been, on the whole, "efficien[t] and flexib[le]" in managing requests for
mutual legal assistance (MLA), as required by the OECD Convention.169
In the 2008 Siemens case, Germany and the United States coordinated
their OECD Convention enforcement efforts to prosecute Siemens AG and
three of its subsidiaries.7 0 Siemens and its subsidiaries had engaged in
corruption that amounted to over "$1.4 billion in bribes [being paid] to
government officials in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the
Americas."'7 ' These bribes were not random, unplanned payments. Rather,
they were systemic: "bribery was nothing less than standard operating
procedure for Siemens.""' The bribery at issue dated back to the 1990s and
included payments and kickbacks to win government contracts for a variety
of projects: "a national identity card project in Argentina [($31 million)],
mass transit work in Venezuela [($19 million)], a nationwide cellphone
network in Bangladesh [($5 million)] and a United Nations oil-for-food
program in Iraq under Saddam Hussein [($1.7 million)]." 7 3 The Munich
Public Prosecutor's Office initiated the bribery investigation into Siemens
when it searched Siemens' offices and the homes of certain Siemens
executives. 11" Siemens then began its own very thorough internal
investigation and gave the DOJ the results." Germany and the U.S.
coordinated their efforts to prosecute Siemens to such an extent that that
they announced their respective sentencing of Siemens on the same day.' 6
Switzerland, another active enforcer of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, has made exemplary use of confiscation."' It has engaged in
awareness-raising efforts, particularly for companies that might be in
168 Id at 48.
169 Id at 61.
170 Elizabeth K. Spahn, Mult/urisdictional Bribe0 Law Enforcement: The OECD Anti-Bribe0
Convention, 53 VA. J. INT'L. L. 1, 26-27 (2012); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Siemens AG and
Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450
Million in Combined Criminal Fines, (Dec. 15, 2008),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html.
171 DOJ Press Release, supra note 170 (quoting Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director of the SEC's
Division of Enforcement).
172 Id (quoting Acting Assistant Attorney General Matthew Friedrich).
173 Eric Lichtblau & Carter Dougherty, Siemens to Pay $1.34 Billion in Fines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/business/worldbusiness/16siemens.htmlr=0; DOJ
Press Release, supra note 170.
174 DOJ Press Release, supra note 170.
175 Id
176 GERMANY PHASE 3, supra note 165, at 48.
177 OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
IN SWITZERLAND 22 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/Switzerlandphase3reportEN.pdf [hereinafter SWITZERLAND PHASE 3].
2018] 245
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
positions that put them at risk of violating anti-bribery laws."' Additionally,
Switzerland has established a specialized section of its Office of the
Attorney-General for economic crime and foreign bribery.7 9 Like other
active enforcers, Switzerland has cooperated with other states in
investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery. Switzerland has responded in
the affirmative to the majority of the MLA requests it has received.8 o It has
provided investigative assistance on the basis of these MLA requests, and it
has coordinated with the other states involved in an investigation and
prosecution to determine the most effective way to proceed against a
violator and how best to avoid double jeopardy, or ne his in idem, when
determining the final outcome of the case.'' For example, Switzerland
assisted France in its investigation of Alstom,' shared information related
to the Alstom investigation with British authorities, 8 3 and assisted the
United States in its investigation of Alstom that resulted in Alstom paying
$772 million in criminal fines for its FCPA violations.'84
The U.K. overhauled its anti-bribery laws in 2010 when it passed the
Bribery Act,'85 and later became an active enforcer of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention in 2014. 1 The new legislation and the newfound
enthusiasm for enforcement likely stem from embarrassment over a case
against BAE Systems.'87 In the 1990s, BAE paid hundreds of millions of
pounds in bribes to Saudi officials to secure an arms deal.'88 Although the
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) investigated, then-Prime Minister Tony Blair
stopped the prosecution from going forward, citing national security
178 OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
IN SWITZERLAND: FOLLOW-UP TO THE PHASE 3 REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 19 (2014),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/SwitzerlandP3WrittenFollowUpReportEN.pdf.
179 SWITZERLAND PHASE 3, supra note 177, at 25.
180 Id at 34-35.
181 Id
182 Id
183 Id at 35.
184 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772 Million
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Charges (Dec. 22, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alstom-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-772-million-criminal-penalty-
resolve-foreign-bribery.
185 OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 9 (2012), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ UnitedKingdomphase3reportEN.pdf [hereinafter UNITED KINGDOM PHASE 3].
186 Press Release, TI UK, Welcome Surge in UK Anti-Bribery Activity Must Be Sustained July
28, 2014), http://www.transparency.org.uk/press-releases/welcome-surge-in-uk-anti-bribery-activity-
must-be-sustained/.
187 Spahn, supra note 170, at 22.
188 Richard Norton-Taylor & David Pallister, Millions in Secret Commissions Paid Outjor SaudiArms
Deal, THE GUARDIAN June 23, 1997), https://www.theguardian.com/world/1997/jun/23/bae.
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concerns that M15 and M16 did not back up.8 9 In one of its reports, the
OECD publicly criticized the U.K. for its failure to prosecute'90 and has
even recommended that it reopen the case.'9' Ultimately, the U.S. pursued
an FCPA case against BAE that resulted in the company's paying $400
million in criminal fines.192 The U.K.'s SFO assisted the DOJ in this
investigation.'93 By the time of the U.K.'s 2012 Phase 3 Report, it had made
"significant efforts to raise awareness of the Bribery Act and the foreign
bribery offen[s]e in both the public and private sectors."'94 The report also
praised the country for a substantial increase in enforcement, compared to
previous years.195
IV. RESOLVING TENSION: THE TRAJECTORY OF NATIONAL ANTI-
BRIBERY LAW ENFORCEMENT
This section analyzes the possible future of cooperation in international
anti-bribery law enforcement. As Section III discussed, the U.S. remains at
the vanguard of foreign anti-corruption prosecutions, but it is not alone-
several other states are also increasing enforcement of their own laws.
Nonetheless, most OECD member countries remain slow to bring
prosecutions for foreign bribery. As discussed above, the OECD treaty has
been a particularly effective mechanism for enforcing anti-bribery law not
because most OECD states are robust enforcers,'96 but because it has
permitted a few motivated states, most notably the U.S., to be robust
enforcers.'97
As this section discusses, the U.S. enforcement of anti-bribery rules has
created some tensions abroad but may create the conditions necessary for
more explicit cooperation and additional multilateral enforcement. Much
like the international trade experience, the tensions created by unilateral
enforcement can establish a basis for a new institution to resolve
enforcement conflicts. The first section discusses the pattern of American
prosecutions and the high fines imposed on foreign firms. The second
189 Spahn, supra note 170, at 22; David Leigh & Rob Evans, Blair Forced Goldsmith to Drop BAE
Charges, THE GUARDIAN Gan. 31, 2007),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/feb/Cl/bae.saudiarabia.
190 Spahn, supra note 170, at 23.
191 UNITED KINGDOM PHASE 3, supra note 185, at 39-40.
192 Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJust., BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400
Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-
and-ordered-pay-400-million-criminal-fine.
193 Id
194 UNITED KINGDOM PHASE 3, supra note 185, at 53.
195 Id at 6.
196 Brewster, spra note 45.
197 Id
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section discusses the possible resolutions of this tension through greater
national enforcement regimes.
A. American Enjorcement and Foregn Companies
The willingness of the U.S. to prosecute foreign companies can create
tensions with other countries, particularly if the U.S. is perceived as possibly
being less than even-handed. It is important to point out that there is no
direct evidence that U.S. prosecutors are biased in their enforcement and we
do not believe there is bias. Other countries may not perceive the situation
similarly, however, when fines against foreign firms appear to be particularly
high.
Table Two presents the top ten fines for FCPA violations. Eight of the
top ten fines have been against foreign firms. In addition, an empirical study
by Professors Choi and Davis found that foreign companies were more
likely to be fined at a higher rate than domestic ones, although that study
could not control for several relevant factors, such as the extent of executive
involvement in bribery, the quality of the evidence (and thus likelihood of
the outcome at trial), and the firm's benefit from corruption.9 8 As such, this
study did not claim that there was bias in the U.S.'s FCPA enforcement.
Table Two: Top Ten FCPA Penalties (as of December 2016)199
1. Siemens (Germany): $800 million in 2008.
2. Alstom (France): $772 million in 2014.
3. K3R/Halliburton (U.S.): $579 million in 2009.
4. Teva Pharmaceutical (srael): $519 million in 2016
5. Och-Ziff (U.S.): $412 million in 2016
6. BAE (U.K.): $400 million in 2010.
7. Total SA (France): $398 million in 2013.
8. VimpelCom (Holland): $397.6 million in 2016.
9. Alcoa (U.S.): $384 million in 2014.
10. Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V./ENI S.p.A (Holland/Italy):
$365 million in 2010.
198 Stephen Choi & Kevin Davis, Forei gn Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 409 (2014). The authors controlled for a number of factors but did not
have data on the quality of the evidence against the firm or the level of cooperation that the firm
provided to the DOJ. See also Brandon L. Garrett, "Globalized Corporate Prosecutions," 97 VA. L.
REV. 1775, 1836 (2011).(also not controlling for fine relevant variables).
199 See Richard L. Cassin, Teva Ranks Fourth on our New Top Ten List, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 27,
2016), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/201 6/12/ 27/teva-ranks-fourth-on-our-new-top-ten-
list.html4sthash.MINpok6j.dpuf.
248 [Vol. 57:2
ANTICORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT
Notwithstanding that lack of direct evidence of bias, some
commentators argue that the DOJ and SEC may not be blind to
nationality.00 The New York Times' Dealbook discussed the perception
among European regulators that the U.S. was targeting foreign
companies.'o Among others, Dealbook cites a French anti-corruption
official complaint that the U.S. used prosecutions to promote its own
economic interests not only in anti-bribery cases but also for sanctions
violations (such as the case against BNP Paribas) and money laundering.2 0 2
The French official stated that the U.S. needed to be careful to ensure that
its actions were not "considered to be extortion by countries."203
Such claims of targeting are rare but not unheard of, and they go in both
directions. The U.S. has recently accused the European Union (E.U.) of
targeting American firms for tax enforcement.0 4 Most notably, the Treasury
Department has objected to the E.U. demand that Apple pay approximately
$14.5 billion in back taxes to Ireland.20 Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew said,
"I have raised the issue that [the] pattern of action appears to be highly
focused on U.S. firms. They point to some small actions against non-U.S.
firms but the largest actions do appear to be aimed squarely at our tax
base."0 6 When, shortly after the Apple tax case, news leaked out that the
DOJ initially offered to settle mortgage-based claims against Deutsche Bank
for $14 billion, commentators questioned whether this was retaliation for
the Apple judgement and the beginning of a tit-for-tat regulatory dispute
between the two economies.0 7
200 See, e.g., Annalisa Leibold, The ExtrateritorialApplication of the FCPA Under International Law,
51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 225 (2015) (arguing that the US's "targeting" of foreign firms for FCPA
prosecution is a violation of international law and "has the effect of giving U.S. companies an unfair
competitive edge in the global marketplace" - quote in abstract on SSRN).
201 Jesse Eisinger, France Sees Double Standard in U.S. Prosecutions ofBNP, but Justice is Weak, N.Y.
TIMES: DEAL B%K, June 18, 2014, https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/questions-of-a-
double-standard-but-really-just-weak-justice/. See also Charles F. Smith & Brittany D. Parling,
"American Imperialism A Practiioner's Experience with Extraterritorial Enforcement of the FCPA, 2012 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 249-51 (discussing foreign perceptions of bias in U.S. investigations of foreign
firms).
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 James Kanter & Mark Scott, Apple Owes $14.5 Billion in Back Taxes to Ireland, E. U. Says, N.Y.
TIMES: TECHNOLOGY, August 30 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/technology/apple-
tax-eu-ireland.html (In addition to Apple, the EU has brought tax claims against "Starbucks in the
Netherlands, Amazon in Luxembourg and Anheuser-Busch InBev in Belgium. The United States
Treasury, one of the most vocal critics of these moves, has said that Europe is overstepping its power,
unfairly targeting American companies and hurting global efforts to curtail tax avoidance.").
205 Saleha Mohsin, EU Apple Tax Ruling Shows US Firms Targted, Lew Says, BNA INT'L TRADE
REP., (Aug. 31, 2016) https:/ /www.bloomberg.com/news /articles /2016-08-31/eu-tax-ruling-on-
apple-a-sign-that-u- s- firms-targeted-lew-says.
206 Id.
207 Martin Arnold, Berlin Urges US to Treat Deutsche Fairl in Mis-selling Case, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 26,
2016, https://www.ft.com/content/28534ee2-7b95-11e6-ae24-fl93b105145e (noting that "there is
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These claims of targeting imply bias; the idea is that regulators are not
treating similarly situated firms the same because of nationality (and
perceived national interest). The perception of bias can undermine states'
willingness to cooperate on international economic issues, including
corruption investigations and recouping back taxes.
While such tensions can undermine cooperation i  the short term, they
can also provide the leverage to seek a new institutional resolution of the
conflict. Governments may reassess the benefits of the status quo and may
be more willing to consider new policies. The U.S. government's strong
unilateral enforcement of trade law lowered the benefits of the status quo
for other GATT members willing to accept a centralized rule-based dispute
resolution system.o Similarly, strong enforcement of anti-bribery law
against foreign firms may make countries reassess the benefits of weak
national enforcement.2 09 Policies that were previously not politically tenable
may be revived as a means to curtail foreign regulators.
B. Possible Institutional Innovations
What is the most likely resolution of this tension regarding
enforcement? This Article argues that an international corruption court, as
proposed by Judge Mark Wolf, is a highly unlikely outcome for practical and
political reasons. Instead, we expect that OECD enforcement officials will
reach an informal agreement to provide a corporation's home country
greater deference in prosecuting corruption allegations if the country
becomes a more active enforcer generally. This would resolve many of the
concerns with possible American bias in enforcement by allowing the
corporation's home government to prosecute and lead to greater overall
enforcement of anti-corruption measures by increasing the resources
dedicated to enforcement in multiple countries.
1. The Impractical Court
some suspicion in financial circles that Deutsche could be the victim of US revenge on Europe.");
Stephen Beard, Deutsche Bank woes h`ghlht European bank issues, MARKETPLACE (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://www.marketplace.org/2016/ 09/30/world/deutschebank-woes-highlight-european-bank-
issues (quoting a commentator stating that "$14 Billion figure sounds suspiciously like retaliation");
Alistair Osborne, US Plays Tit-Jor-Tat over Apple Tax, TIMES (LONDON) (Sept. 17, 2016),
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/us-plays-tit-for-tat-over-apple-tax-Onvnwjnwh (noting "you don't
have to be a total cynic to spot a sort of proxy trade war").
208 See infra Section II.
209 This is true in the tax case as well. The tensions between the US and EU may speed up the
creation of an international agreement to coordinate tax policy over certain multinationals, which are
perceived as engaged in tax avoidance. See Mohsin, supra note 205, (noting that Secretary Lew hoped
that Apple dispute would speed up a tax overhaul by Congress to address this issue).
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In the international trade context, greater American pressure for
enforcement of GATT trade rules led to the adoption of a formalized
dispute resolution process in the WTO.o The U.S. was the major party
leading this political charge, and it successfully leveraged international
tensions over unilateral enforcement into a binding multilateral process."'
The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding is very successful, but it is
important to note that it is limited in a number of ways that minimize the
political reach of the process. First, only WTO members can sue one
another; there is not an independent prosecutor who can bring cases and
there is no private party standing." As such, states are a political gatekeeper
on issues presented at the WTO. Second, only governments, not officials,
can be sued.213 Third, the parties are free to settle cases at any time for less
than full compliance."4 Fourth, there are no retrospective damages, so states
do not face any costs for WTO-inconsistent policies that are removed post-
adjudication."
We believe that a court in the anti-corruption area is significantly less
likely to develop, because the field cannot have many of the same political
limits that the WTO system includes. Unlike the WTO context, anti-
corruption cases are generally cases brought by individual prosecutors
against individuals or companies seeking to punish past actions. For
instance, Judge Mark Wolf has put forward the most noted proposal for an
international court to address corruption.1 6 Wolf proposes an international
court similar to the International Criminal Court (CC): it would have an
independent prosecutor's office which could bring criminal or civil charges
against government leaders or private parties; all signatory states would have
to agree to cooperate with the prosecutor's office; and the court could order
the imprisonment of those found guilty of corruption."' While all of these
characteristics might make the court attractive in a political vacuum, these
same elements will most likely make the court untenable as a matter of
international politics."
210 See infra Section 11.2.
211 Id
212 Brewster, Remedy Gap, supra note 36, at 112-16.
213 Id
214 Id
215 Id As the article discusses, WTO members have the odd incentive to drag out litigation for
as long as possible under this remedy rule.
216 See Mark L. Wolf, The Case for an InternationalAnti-Corruption Court, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
PAPER (2014); see a/so Wolf, Opinion, supra note 4.
217 Wolf, Internationa/Anti-Corrption Court, supra note 216, at 10-13.
218 See Julian Ku, Lt's Be Real: An InternationaAnti-Corruption Court Would Never Work, OPINIO
JURIS BLOG (Nov. 25, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/11/25/lets-real-international-anti-
corruption-court-never-work/.;. See also Matthew Stephenson, The Case Against the International Anti-
Corruption Court, GLOBAL ANTI-CORRUPTION BLOG (July 31, 2014),
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Government leaders would be very cautious about signing up for a court
that would have jurisdiction to indict them personally for corrupt activities.21 9
Wolf responds that this could be handled by making WTO membership and
future World Bank loans contingent on joining the court.220 Wolf evidently
believes that only economically developing states would be reluctant to join
(and thus why economic strong arming would be effective).221 Even
ignoring the legitimacy issues this would raise, it is far from clear that
developed states could achieve or would want to achieve such an outcome.
First, there is little reason to think that G7 members of the WTO have
any interest in tying anti-corruption law to international trade law.2 The
WTO agreements could include anti-bribery principles but trade negotiators
have decided to isolate anti-corruption rules from general trade rules.2 2 3
During the 1980s, American trade negotiators made a significant push to
incorporate anti-bribery rules into the multilateral trading system, but the
effort failed as other states demanded that the U.S. provide market-access
concessions .224 The U.S. is no more likely to provide market-access
concession for anti-corruption now than it was in the 1980s.225
Furthermore, neither the U.S. nor the E.U. is in a position to simply
demand that such a condition be a new requirement of WTO membership.
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/07/31 / the-case-against-an-international-anti-
corruption-court/ (noting the threat of prosecuting government leaders will make government leaders
reluctant to join the court in developed and developing states).
219 See Wolf, supra note 218.
220 Wolf, InternationalAndi-Corruption Court, supra note 216, at 10-13.
221 Id. (recommending the use of economic coercion as a mechanism to get developing states to
join the Anticorruption Court agreement).
222 The WTO addresses corruption only vaguely in one plurilateral agreement, the 2012 Revised
Agreement on Government Procurement. As a plurilateral agreement, not all WTO members need to
join the agreement and many have not. The agreement regulates the governments' own procurement
procedures and does not criminalize corrupt behavior. The agreement calls for states to have bidding
processes for government contracts that prevents conflicts of interest and prevents corruption. See
Annex to the Protocol Amending the Agreement on Government Procurement Art. IV(4)(b-c),
adopted on 30 March 2012 (GPA/1 13) (entered into force April 6, 2014).
Some commentators hope that another voluntary WTO Agreement, the Trade Facilitation
Agreement (TFA) could also reduce corruption, although it is not explicitly a requirement of the
agreement. The TFA standardizes port procedures and may have the effect of making corruption at
customs offices more difficult. See Evelyn Suarez, Does Trade Facilitation Matter in the F ght against
Corruption?, GLOBAL TRADE MAGAZINE (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.globaltrademag.com/global-
trade-daily/commentary/does-trade-facilitation-matter-in-the-fight-against-corruption.
223 Kenneth W. Abbott, Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case ofiBriber and Corruption, 4
J. OF INT'L ECON. L. 2, 275-296 (2001); Krista N. Schefer, & Mintewab G. Woldesenbet, The Revised
greement on Government Procurement and Coruption, 47 J. OF WORLD TRADE 5, 1129-1161 (2013).
224 Abbott, supra note 223, at 277.
225 If anything, the American political system is now less inclined to grant any trade concessions
for almost any purpose. The election of Donald Trump in November 2016 may represent a high water
mark for resistance to additional trade concessions. See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, As EU and Japan
Strengthen Trade Ties, US Risks Losing Its Voice, N.Y. TIMES: BUSINESS DAY, July 6, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/business/eu-japan-trade-us.html (discussing the Trump
Administration's rejection of trade deals and return to protectionist policies).
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The Doha negotiations, the WTO's platform for further trade deals, have
famously collapsed, as many emerging market countries demand changes to
trade rules as the condition for further liberalization."' As a result, it is far
from clear that efforts by developed states to renegotiate the WTO
Agreement to demand membership in an international and-corruption court
would be successful without major concessions on highly sensitive trade
issues.
Second, developed countries may prefer to maintain control over their
own foreign corruption prosecutions. Deciding what cases to bring and on
what terms to settle involves significant discretion, and national
governments may prefer to keep this discretion in-house rather than
delegate this power to an international prosecutor. As Professor Matthew
Stephenson, who runs the Global Anti-Corruption Blog, points out, the U.S.
government has refused to join the International Criminal Court because of
the possible ambiguity in what qualifies as a violation of the conduct of
war."' Corruption is arguably even more ambiguous and applies to
significantly more government acuvity, and, thus, the risks of establishing
an independent international prosecutorial office are even greater here."
In short, there is no political momentum to create an international anti-
corruption judicial system to centralize global enforcement of national
bribery laws. For all the reasons listed above, there is very little chance that
governments will wish to develop a supranational enforcement system in
the near future. However, the impracticality of an international anti-
corruption court does not mean that states cannot cooperate on anti-
corruption policy. The next section outlines how informal coordination
could emerge.
2. Informal Resolutions
If not a formal international dispute resolution system, then what? An
alternative is to maintain the current system of national level prosecutions
but to more explicitly coordinate these prosecutions. This could take the
form of a tacit or informal but overt agreement for the U.S. to defer to
national regulators of the corporation's home state if that state provides
robust enforcement. Such an agreement could decrease the allegations of
bias in U.S. prosecutions. National prosecutors would effectively have the
first bite at prosecuting national companies for foreign bribery. Where
national prosecutors fail to bring cases (or only bring "sham" cases), U.S.
regulators could step in. The promise of U.S. deference to national
226 The Doha Round Finally Dies a Merciful Death: Governments Must Now Pursue Trade Multilateralism
Piece by Piece, FIN. TIMES. (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/9cblab9e-a7e2-11e5-955c-
le1d6de94879.
227 Stephenson, supra note 218.
228 Id.
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prosecutors could also increase the global enforcement of anti-bribery rules
(and thereby broaden the enforcement net) as more countries devote
resources to prosecuting foreign bribery and develop expertise in resolving
these cases under their own national laws.
As it did in international trade law, the U.S.'s unilateral enforcement of
anti-corruption rules has the potential to spur greater multilateral
enforcement. Transnational conflict over the American application of the
FCPA may create the bargaining space for OECD governments to reach a
new (although still decentralized) agreement on the domestic enforcement
of national laws prohibiting foreign bribery. If OECD governments want
American enforcers to have greater deference for "home" government
enforcement, then the price of this bargain can be greater enforcement
efforts.22 9 Foreign governments' first preference may be for low
enforcement of bribery laws. However, if that option is off the table because
of American FCPA enforcement efforts, then foreign governments may
find that they prefer to step up their own enforcement efforts rather than
delegate the settlement of these cases to the DOJ and SEC.
Currently, some OECD governments are already increasing their
domestic enforcement of foreign bribery law to compete with American
prosecutors. As the next section discusses, Germany and the U.K. have
become active enforcers, in part, to have a hand in the regulation of
important national companies. Similarly, France is in the process of
improving its foreign bribery law to have a voice in the settlement erms for
its companies.
We argue that this tacit coordination may become an informal
agreement between OECD members. Specifically, if a country is an "active
enforcer" of anti-bribery law, then other states (including the U.S.) will defer
to its prosecution of a state's company. However, if the country is not an
aggressive enforcer or the country offers overly lenient settlements, then
others would be free to bring their own prosecutions. Such an agreement
would increase the overall enforcement of anti-bribery rules by expanding
the number of states dedicating resources to prosecutions and extending the
geographic scope of transactions that are likely to be prosecuted. Although
229 International law does not prohibit countries from trying a person or corporation for the
same crime. That is, there is no double jeopardy between countries' jurisdiction as a matter of
international law. See Paul B. Stephan, Regulatory Competition andAni-Corrupion Law, 53 VA.J. INT'L L.
53 (2012) (discussing regulatory competition between states over anti-corruption law and how multiple
can have jurisdiction to prosecute concurrently). As a matter of domestic law, some countries may
prohibit the prosecution of a person or corporation if the matter was already adjudicated in another
country's legal system but it is a matter of discretion for each state. The U.S. does not have a bar on
cross-national double jeopardy. See Fredrick Davis, Does International Law Require an International Double
Jeopardy Bar?, GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/10/18/guest-post-does-international-law-require-an-
international-double-jeopardy-bar/ (discussing international law, American law, and French law).
254 [Vol. 57:2
ANTICORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT
the number of U.S. enforcement actions may decrease, the potential for the
U.S. to bring more foreign prosecutions would provide a backstop to lax
enforcement abroad. As is discussed in the final part of this section, it is
unlikely that all OECD members will enter into such an informal agreement
with the U.S., but a number of major economies may do so.
a. Current Trends in Germany, the U.K., and France
There is some evidence of this political dynamic already playing out as
key European governments ramp up enforcement after working jointly with
American prosecutors on a case against a major domestic company.230 For
instance, German enforcement of anti-bribery laws increased significantly
after the Siemens case, where the two countries worked together to bring
charges. Siemens settled simultaneously with both American and German
prosecutors, paying each country approximately $800 million in criminal
fines and other penalties.3 Similarly, the U.K. increased enforcement of its
domestic foreign anti-bribery law (including passing new legislation that
dramatically increased the range of corporate behavior that could be
prosecuted and increased the prosecutor's jurisdiction) after working with
American prosecutors in the BAE case.3 There, the Blair government had
quashed the domestic investigation of BAE after the Saudi Royal family
(who had allegedly received the bribes from BAE executives) objected.3
The DOJ then stepped in to bring its own case against BAE, which the
British government eventually joined.
In both of those cases, important OECD countries arguably saw the
potential for U.S. prosecutors to be the primary anti-bribery regulators of
important national companies and responded. By joining the prosecutions
of these companies, German and British officials had a seat at he settlement
230 In fact, one empirical study of the FCPA found that the best predictor of a state's willingness
to enforce its own and-bribery laws in the future was its cooperation with an American FCPA
prosecution. Sarah C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Iaw: Extraterdtoality
and the National Implementation ofForeign Briber Legislation, 65 INT'L ORG. 745 (2011).
231 Dougherty & Lichtblau, supra note 173 (noting that Siemens paid a total of $1.6 billion
including criminal fines and other penalties).
232 The new U.K. law is generally considered as strong (if not stronger) than the FCPA. See Jon
Jordon, Recent Developments in the Foregn Corrupt Practices Act and the New UK Briber Act: A Global Trend
Towards Greater Accountabilit in the Prevention ofForeign Briber, 7 NYU J. L. & Bus. 845, 863-68 (2010)
(reviewing the ways in which the U.K. Bribery Act strengthens domestic law). It is unclear, however,
the British Serious Frauds Office (SFO) will be as effective an enforcer as the DOJ. See Elizabeth K.
Spahn, Implementing GlobalAnti-Bribe Norms: From the Foregn Corupt Practices Act to the OECD Anti-
Briber Convention to the U.N Convention Against Couption, 23 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 1 (2013)
(discussing the strength of the law but questioning the SFO's ability to enforce the law as rigorously as
the DOJ).
233 Lowell Bergman & Nelson D. Schwartz, Payload: Taking Aim at Corporate BrbeD, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 25 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/business/25bae.htm (discussing the
termination of the BAE case in the U.K.).
234 Id.
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table.235  Given the importance of Siemens and BAE (in terms of
employment, the tax base, and exports) to the German and British
economies, respectively, these governments would be very interested in
having a voice in determining the level of criminal and civil fines and,
possibly more importantly, the terms of the company's anti-bribery
monitoring going forward. For instance, in the Siemens case, the DOJ
agreed with German prosecutors to appoint a German national to monitor
Siemen's future business practices and ensure the company refrained from
re-engaging in foreign bribery.3 6 The German national, Dr. Theo Waigel,
had served as the German Finance Minister from 1989 to 1998, and so was
much attuned to the German government's interests in rehabilitating
Siemens as an internationally competitive corporation." Only by increasing
their own prosecutorial efforts could Germany and the U.K. have the
opportunity to be part of future settlement negotiations.
These dynamics are currently playing out in France. In 2015, the DOJ
successfully prosecuted the French energy giant, Alstom, under the
FCPA.3 Unlike the Siemens and BAE cases, the French government did
not join the prosecution and did not have a role in the settlement. DOJ
prosecutors exacted the largest criminal fine in FCPA history, $772
miflion.23 9 Shortly after the Alstom prosecution, the French government
decided to revise its foreign anti-bribery law to strengthen the power of
French prosecutors in bribery cases, and to make settlements easier under
French law.240 The French government certainly has many reasons
motivating its efforts to strengthen its foreign anti-bribery laws, but one
appears to be an effort to stave off more American-only prosecutions.
Having greater domestic enforcement power allows French prosecutors to
235 Press Release No. 08-1105, Dep't of Just. Off. of Pub. Aff., Siemens AG and Three
Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million
in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1 105.html {DE: Needs
permalink} (announcing the Siemens settlement with the DOJ for $450 million, the SEC for $350
million, and German authorities for approximately another $800 million. Siemens also agreed to a
government-imposed independent monitor.); Press Release, No. 10-209 , BAE Systems PLC Pleads
Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine, Dep't ofJust. Off. of Pub. Aff (March 1, 2010)
(acknowledging joint British settlement).
236 Anne Richardson & Alexandra Wrage, Siemens AG - Violations of the Foreign Cort Practices
Act, 48 INT'L L. MAT. 232, 234 (2009).
237 Id
238 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Alstom Sentenced to Pay $772 Million Criminal Fine to
Resolve Foreign Bribery Charges, Nov. 13, 2015.
239 Id
240 La loi Sapin 2 contre la corruption arrive d l'Assemblie nationale Sapin 2 andi-corrption law arrives before
the NationalAssembhy], LE MONDE, June 6, 2016; see also New French Anti-Bribery Law Expected in 2016,
TRACE INTERNATIONAL BLOG (Oct. 20,2015), https://www.traceinternational.org/blog/154 (noting
that " In the absence of robust French enforcement, U.S. regulators have been active in the jurisdiction
- three of the top ten largest settlements under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) belong to
French companies (Alstom, Total SA, and Technip)").
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join the enforcement process and have more of a role in reaching
settlements with important national companies.
The current state of affairs appears to be a tacit agreement among
national prosecutors to work together in bringing cases against major
multinational companies if both governments are actively investigating the
company. However, this tacit coordination could develop into an informal
agreement if more OECD governments started rigorously enforcing their
anti-bribery laws. As is discussed in the next part, such an agreement could
be informal, in the sense that it would not have to be memorialized in an
amendment to the OECD treaty. Rather, the agreement could be an
understanding between prosecutors that "home" governments have primary
jurisdiction over a company if they have a robust enforcement program. The
potential benefit of having primary jurisdiction over these cases could be a
sufficient incentive to encourage lagging states to increase their enforcement
capacity.
b. The Outline of an Informal Agreement
One means of achieving greater cooperation between OECD countries
would be to implicitly incorporate a deference principle of horizontal
complementarity between states in anti-bribery prosecutions.24'
Prosecutors in the OECD Working Group could operationalize this
principle on a case-by-case basis. Governments with a good record of
enforcing their national law on foreign bribery would have a "first right" to
bring charges against a company based in their country. Other national
prosecutors would efer to the home government's prosecution.
241 Complementarity is a legal doctrine providing that one party will respect the primary
jurisdiction of another party. The Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)
incorporates complementarity as a fundamental principle by rendering cases "inadmissible where: (a)
The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution..." Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Rome, 17 July 1998) UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998, entered
intoforce 1 July 2002, Art. 17 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the application of complementarity
see Philippa Webb and Morten Bergsmo, International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, Complementarity and
Jurisdiction, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INT'L LAW (Nov. 10, 2010), at ¶ 11 ("States
have the first responsibility and right to prosecute the most serious crimes of international concern.
The ICC may only exercise jurisdiction where the national legal system 'is unwilling or unable genuinely
to carry out the investigation or prosecution."') (describing complementarity principles in the
International Criminal Court).
Horizontal complementarity is the term used to refer to situations where there is a
horizontal relationship (e.g. co-equal sovereign states) rather than a vertical relationship (national
court and international court) between parties. See Cedric Ryngaert, Hori&ontal Complementarit, in
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
855-87 (C. Stahn & M. El Zeidy eds., 2014) (discussing complementarity between state prosecutors);
see also, Laura Burens, Universal Jurisdiction Meets Complementarity: An Approach towards a Desirable Future
Codflcation of Horiontal Complementarity between the Member States of the International Criminal Court, 27
CRIM. L. FORUM 75 (2016) (same).
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The prosecutors in the OECD's working group would not need to
explicitly adopt a formal doctrine of complementarity as the ICC has done.
Indeed, the formulation of the complementarity concept would not have to
be as formal or rigid as the ICC's principle. Instead, the prosecutors in the
OECD working group could reach a consensus that governments with a
good track record of enforcing their national laws on foreign bribery would
have the "first right" to bring anti-bribery charges against a company based
in their country independently. Other jurisdictions would defer to the home
government's prosecution.
This would change the status quo by leading to fewer dual prosecutions
even where dual jurisdiction exists. For instance, if a Germany company that
listed on a U.S. exchange (as Siemens did) engaged in foreign bribery, then
both American and German regulators would have jurisdiction under their
anti-bribery laws.42 Ordinarily, U.S. regulators would bring a prosecution
and coordinate with German prosecutors (as in the Siemens case). However,
with a complementarity principle in place, German regulators would bring
the prosecution, and American regulators would defer to their action and
provide assistance. Prioritizing home government prosecutions would limit
the claims of overreaching and concerns about bias that currently exist
within the system of American-led enforcement.
Such a system could encourage OECD states to invest greater resources
in their anti-bribery enforcement systems. Effectively, the U.S. would be
offering the carrot of greater prosecutorial control over the foreign
country's own companies in return for greater dedication to domestic
enforcement. Given the importance of major multinational companies, such
as Apple, Google, Siemens, and BAE, to a national economy, governments
(particularly states with smaller economies) will put a premium on the ability
to be the primary regulator of that company. Currently, American regulators
will bring an FCPA prosecution against major foreign corporations even if
the home state does as well, as occurred in the Siemens and BAE cases.
Countries will have a greater incentive to invest in their domestic
enforcement capacity if they believe that they will have full control of the
prosecution and not just a seat in settlement talks.
In return for implementing a norm of complementarity, the U.S.
government could demand that other OECD signatories increase their
domestic efforts to police their national companies, particularly those
companies that do not list on American stock exchanges. Such a trade could
increase the jurisdictional net from the current system. The American-led
enforcement system has been very successful in providing anti-bribery law
242 German prosecutors would have jurisdiction under the nationality principle. The FCPA
provides US prosecutors with jurisdiction if there is a territorial link. See 15 U.S.C. 78dd-3(a) (1998).
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real bite for the world's biggest multinational companies, the vast majority
of which list on American exchanges. However, American enforcement has
limited jurisdictional hooks to private overseas foreign corporations or small
and medium enterprises that do not list on American exchanges.43 If other
OECD states increased their enforcement of anti-bribery laws against this
class of corporation, then the worldwide scope for effective anti-bribery law
would expand. In addition to decreasing the supply of bribes globally, this
could also increase the global competitiveness of American small-to-
medium-sized enterprises, which already face strict FCPA enforcement.
On balance, such an informal agreement could benefit all OECD
countries. The U.S. could benefit by having other countries take on greater
enforcement responsibilities. This would increase the jurisdictional net for
anti-bribery enforcement (by reaching companies and individuals that fall
outside of the FCPA's jurisdiction) and by allowing U.S. authorities to direct
resources to additional cases. Other OECD nations could also gain
advantages by having greater control over the prosecutions of "home"
companies.'44 However, not all OECD states will want to increase their
domestic enforcement of anti-bribery law. For those states, American
prosecutors need not defer to national regulators; instead, it should continue
the current practice of American-led dual (or solo U.S.) prosecutions. Thus
there is a possible two-track system in the future where some states benefit
from complementarity and others do not.
Two caveats are appropriate here. First, an informal agreement to
implement a norm of complementarity would not be a bar to dual
prosecutions. Most obviously, the U.S. could continue to bring cases in
coordination with foreign governments that have lax anti-bribery
enforcement. In addition, American prosecutors could bring a case when
the home state only brings a "sham" prosecution-that is, settles the case on
terms that are grossly disproportionate with the severity and extensiveness
of the crime.45 Finally, the "host" country (the country where the bribe was
offered) could also always have jurisdiction over the case since the
corruption occurred in its territory and was designed to influence its
government officials. For instance, if a British firm was involved in bribing
243 The FCPA can still apply if part of the bribery scheme occurred within the territory of the
United States. See 15 U.S.C. 78dd-3(a) (1998). Also, the DOJ can have jurisdiction over any American
employees, members of the board of directors or agents. See id. 3(d).
244 These states would also get to keep a greater proportion of the criminal fines collected against
the companies. On the whole, however, these fines are not a significant source of state revenue and
will not be a major motivation for states to undertake higher levels of enforcement.
245 A similar idea may be found in the ICC - sham prosecutions (non-genuine to use the
language of the Rome Statute) don't trigger Article 17 and the ICC may admit the case. See supra, note
Error! Bookmark not defined..
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an Italian official, the U.S. might defer to a U.K. government prosecution,
but Italian prosecutors would not need to do so.
Second, how would an informal agreement at the OECD be enforced?
The OECD does not have a binding dispute resolution system and the
agreement hat is proposed here would not be "hard law," in the sense that
it would not be a formal amendment o the OECD Anti-Bribery treaty.46
Indeed, it is likely that prosecutors will reach an informal consensus
regarding the proper level of deference between home and extraterritorial
regulators. Nonetheless, this agreement would be relatively easy to
enforce.'4 Enforcement of an international agreement does not require
third-party dispute resolution systems.48 Parties can enforce an agreement
themselves when they can accurately monitor one another's behavior and
impose costs on one another's non-compliance.2 49
In this case, there are two elements that would need to be monitored:
whether the country is rigorously enforcing its anti-bribery law (and is
thereby entitled to deference) and, if so, whether a country is engaging in a
sham prosecution (and other states may intervene to bring their own
prosecutions). The first element is already the subject of extensive
monitoring. The OECD issues regular reports on countries' enforcement
efforts and is known to be quite critical.5 o Transparency International also
conducts an assessment of countries' anti-bribery enforcement,251 so there
is redundancy in this monitoring process (and thus politics is less likely to
distort a country's assessments).
Countries are also in a good position to monitor sham prosecutions.
The OECD Working Group on Bribery is made up, in part, of national
252prosecutors. They generally share professional norms and experiences,
246 Our definition of hard law refers to international law that is formally binding as part of a
treaty regime. It is holds the status of a contract, a legal binding commitment between two parties. See
Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581, 582-83 (2005)
(discussing the idea of hard law). Other commentators will sometimes refer to law being "hard" or
"soft" based on its precision. We respect but do not adopt this definition. Contra Kenneth W. Abbott
& Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Lw in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 445 (2000).
247 See Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Foreign Relations Law as Soft Law, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
735, 745-47 (2014) (discussing a host of soft law agreements where national regulators meet to share
information and coordinate enforcement).
248 See ROBERT SCOTT & PAUL STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF THE LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT
THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006) (discussing the conditions under
which questions of compliance with international law are better resolved between the parties). These
authors draw upon a much more extensive literature in international relations theory (and contract law)
about what is necessary to sustain cooperation. See, e.g., George Downs et al., Is Good News About
Compliance Good News about Cooperation? 50 INT'L ORG. 379 (1996) (discussing the minimum conditions
required to enforce international agreements).
249 SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 248, at 4.
250 See discussion, supra notes 123-152.
251 See EXPORTING CORRUPTION, supra note 116.
252 Ben W. Heineman & Fritz Heimann, The long war against corruption, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 75, 83-
85 (2006) (discussing the role of OECD working group in evaluating state enforcement efforts).
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such as commitment to the rule of law, experience with the difficulties of
litigating cases, and concepts of "fair" settlements. By using this existing
network, prosecutors, even those from different legal systems, will be able
to monitor whether other governments are resolving cases within the range
of feasible outcomes, given the strength of the evidence and the seriousness
of the charges. These actors will be able detect weak or sham settlements
and call each other out on them.
Finally, the parties are able to self-enforce the agreement because they
can always revert to their previous policies. If some countries think that
American regulators are not honoring their promise to respect
complementarity in prosecutions, they can scale back their domestic
enforcement. If American regulators think that other states are bringing
sham prosecutions or are enforcing too weakly, they can start bringing more
solo or dual prosecutions. In short, a coordinated, informal agreement will
survive only if both sides see a benefit and adjust heir behavior accordingly.
While an informal agreement to adopt a consensus norm of
complementarity may or may not succeed, this is likely to be the most
fruitful path to increase global anti-bribery enforcement.
V. CONCLUSION
The evolution of the international anti-bribery and trade regimes has
dramatically altered the terrain of global market regulation. Currently,
scholarly analysis has considered the development of the two fields as the
product of independent processes, each addressing conceptually distinct
aspects of international economic law. This Article posits that the two
regimes are intertwined, regulating different aspects of the same competitive
global market conditions. Furthermore, understanding the history of
multilateral enforcement in international trade law yields key insights into
the tensions and opportunities presented in multilateral efforts to enforce
international anti-bribery law.
By reconceiving the foreign anti-bribery regime as responsive to similar
concerns confronted by the international trade framework, it is possible to
sketch out helpful parallels in conceptualizing the history and effect of the
two approaches to combatting official and unofficial barriers to global
markets. Noting that persistent U.S. enforcement of international trade law
resulted in a shift from unilateral to multilateral enforcement, we must
contemplate the trajectory of the FCPA and the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention through the same lens. The global anti-bribery regime is poised
to follow a similar path as trade law, wherein continued U.S. FCPA
prosecutions are likely to be leveraged into an informal and flexible
multilateral anti-bribery framework built on notions of complementarity.
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The emergent multilateral anti-bribery regime would have notable
differences from the international trade regime. The regime would remain
decentralized in national legal systems, rather than centralized in an
international organization or independent court. In addition, the anti-
bribery regime would be far more fluid, with national authorities
(particularly U.S. prosecutors) reviewing partner countries' investigative
efforts, prosecutions, and settlements. Although there would not be a
"corruption court," this informal multilateral agreement could coordinate
national enforcement efforts to maximize global enforcement in a politically
feasible manner.
Informality and flexibility do not connote weakness. Quite the opposite,
these institutional features provide the highest up-side potential for
expanding the jurisdictional reach of existing national anti-bribery laws
while, concurrently, limiting the down-side potential by retaining existing
enforcement capacity. Restated, the U.S. government can potentially expand
global enforcement by establishing a complementarity principle with foreign
prosecutors who similarly adopt rigorous anti-bribery standards. The U.S.
government could defer to foreign prosecutors but maintain its existing
system of strong extraterritorial enforcement if international cooperation
failed.
262 [Vol. 57:2
